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Abstract
This paper suggests a structure that makes room for a class of solutions to the mental
causation problem.
1 The mental causation problem
The core of the mental causation problem, as I see it, is that there is more than one candi-
date for what makes the effect of a mental event happen. One of those candidates seems
to have the best possible credentials for making the effect happen. The rest have less good
credentials. The best candidate wins; hence only it makes the effect happen. And, finally,
the best candidate is not mental. What makes your actions happen isn’t your thoughts;
rather it’s your physical makeup. (I take it that calling this the “mental” causation problem
is a bit of a misnomer, since the same problem comes up for anything outside of physics.)
What I’m going to do here is suggest a structure for getting out of the problem. I’ll
spend some time at the end discussing some problems for solutions based on the structure.
2 Background
I’m going to make some standard assumptions about the background for this problem.
• Physicalism: every actual concrete individual is made up of nothing but physical
matter. “Physical” means: referred to by an ideal completed theory of what makes
things happen in the natural world.
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• Closure: physics is closed in the sense that for anything that happens, there is a
purely physical cause, if it has a cause at all.
• Causal relevance: when one event causes another, the cause has properties in virtue
of which it causes the effect. Events are “coarse-grained”, that is, they are indi-
viduals that have many properties. Given an effect, some of the cause’s properties
matter to the existence and character of the effect, others do not. Call this relation
on properties causal relevance.
• Supervenience: mental properties supervene on physical properties.
3 Property identity
A fairly popular strategy for dealing with the mental causation recently is to say that men-
tal properties are identical to physical properties. Kim (2005) uses the mental causation
problem to argue against non-reductivism and for identifying mental events with physical
events. Heil (2003) holds that there are properties (or dispositions) and their existence
and manifestation constitute truthmakers for propositions about various kinds of things,
among them the mental ones. More recently1 Heil suggests that this kind of view fits
nicely with Davidson’s anomalous monism (1970): it’s not about properties, it’s about
which descriptions go with which laws.
There is at least a whiff of eliminativism about the property identity view. The view
says there are no distinctively mental properties. It’s not literally true of you that you have
the property of thinking about Australia. One might then say: if nothing, really, has any
mental properties, then there are no minds.
This is not a decisive consideration. According to Heil, it is literally true of you that
you think about Australia. There are dispositions that make this claim true. They have
physical descriptions as well.
Yet Heil’s view is committed to a distinction between ways that the world makes sen-
tences true: (a) its properties and objects are the referents of the predicates and referring
terms of the sentences; (b) something else. Truth and existence look sort of second-class
1Presentation at the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Savannah, GA, April 2009.
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on the second way: perhaps mental sentences are made true in some way similar to the
way sentences about the average family are made true. There’s still the whiff of elimina-
tivism. I would prefer a robustly non-eliminative position, and so I think we need to say
that mental properties are not identical to physical properties.
Non-reductivism and non-identity Non-identity is supposed to follow from irre-
ducibility. The main arguments for irreducibility are the multiple realizability argument
and Davidson’s argument about the rationality of the propositional attitudes. Both argu-
ments are controversial and troubled.
I favor a neoCartesian modal argument. Suppose that non-physical bearers of mental
properties are conceivable; and suppose this is enough to show that they are logically
possible. Now suppose that properties are individuated with respect to their logically
possible bearers, so that if some possible individual a has property P1 and lacks P2, then
P1 is not identical to P2. Then if some possible individual has mental properties and lacks
any physical properties, then the mental properties are not identical with the physical
properties.
This argument is consistent with physicalism as I describe it above. So a mental prop-
erty can be non-physical, in this sense, without being in any way “spooky” and without
any of the mental particulars in our world (or any world of which our physics is true)
having any non-physical parts or accompaniments. It’s also consistent with closure as I
described it above.
4 The problem, again
Kim’s is the standard formulation of the mental causation problem these days. Slightly
modified, Kim’s argument goes like this. Assume (for reductio) that a mental event causes
some effect in virtue of having some mental property. By supervenience, the event and
the effect have physical properties that are referred to by an explanation from completed
ideal physics. By closure, the physical properties matter to the effect. Hence there are
two candidates for which property instance causes the effect: the cause having its mental
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property, or the cause having its physical property. The Exclusion Principle says that no
more than one independent candidate can make the effect happen. The best candidate
wins; so the mental event causes the effect only in virtue of having its physical property.
5 Independence and non-distinctness
In recent formulations, Kim’s exclusion principle rules out “more than one sufficient
cause” (Kim, 2005, 42); in his original formulation it rules out more than one “inde-
pendent” cause (Kim, 1989, 239). As Bennett (2003) and others have pointed out, the
assumption of supervenience entails that the mental cause and the the physical cause are
not independent. The more recent formulation raises a further question: what if the mental
cause isn’t strictly distinct from the physical cause—what if, in some useful sense, they
aren’t strictly speaking more than one thing?
So here’s my suggestion for a structure for mental causation: the mental is not iden-
tical to the physical, but it is not distinct from it either. (See Sanford (2005) for a nice
discussion of the distinction between non-identity and distinctness.)
6 How to use the structure
There are lots of ways to implement this structure, that is, ways to set up our metaphysics
of causation to satisfy the structure.
• Nomological covariation. If the physical properties P just do nomologically necessi-
tate the mental properties M, then there’s a sense at least in which the mental is not
distinct from the physical.
• Constitution. Pereboom (2002, 2001) suggests that the causal powers of instances
of mental properties are constituted by the causal powers of the instances of their
realizers.
• Coincidence. Yablo (1992) argues that mental events coincide with physical events—
they have all their “categorical” properties in common, but differ in their essential
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properties. Causation, then, is governed by a “proportionality” constraint. So a men-
tal event is suitably proportional to an action, while the physical event on which it
supervenes is not.
• Intersection. Watkins (2002), Clapp (2001), and Shoemaker (1998) suggest that
the causal powers of multiply-realized properties are the intersection of the causal
powers of their realizers.2
• Union. Lewis (1983) suggests that properties are sets of actual and possible individ-
uals. Then multiply-realized properties are just the union of their realizers. The set
of all the red things properly includes the set of scarlet things, for instance. I don’t
think Lewis himself makes this suggestion; I do, in Dardis (2008).
And others.
Perhaps a general name for what is going on here is “overlap”.3 Let “generalities”
name whatever it is that particulars have in common (for instance: properties, kinds, uni-
versals, types, dispositions, exactly similar tropes, powers, capacities, potentialities . . . ),
such that particulars make things happen in virtue of some of their generalities. Suppose
generalities can overlap. Two items such that one overlaps the other are neither identi-
cal nor fully distinct. It is particularly straightforward to explain overlap if the items in
question are set-like. Lewisian properties clearly can overlap, by way of set-inclusion. On
the Watkins/Clapp/Shoemaker view, the causal power of a multiply realized property is a
proper subset of the causal powers of each of its realizers, hence overlaps them. Constitu-
tion (the Pereboom/Kornblith view) looks like another promising way to explain overlap.
It’s less clear how to explain overlap on Yablo’s coincidence strategy: coincident events
are not identical, and they are not independent, but it’s not clear whether we should say
they are not distinct. The nomological covariation strategy has only non-independence,
and so has even more work to do to explain what overlap might be.
What about the other kinds of generalities?
2I think Watkins is the originator of this idea; I learned of it from him in 1996 at John Heil’s NEH “Meta-
physics of Mind” summer seminar.
3(Harbecke, 2008, 165) defines “new compatibilism” about the mental causation problem as a family of
solutions to the problem that deny the identity of mental things and physical things, and at the same time deny
their distinctness. Harbecke’s own view is a refinement of Yablo’s.
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The nature of properties and the rest is obscure. I want to suggest that the way to
discover their nature is to work out a good philosophical theory of what they are. The test
of a good theory is what it explains. One thing we might want of such a theory is that it
provides a way to solve the mental causation problem. In this spirit, then, we can try out
as an axiom about properties that properties can overlap. So, just as the set of red things
properly includes the set of scarlet things, we can stipulate that the property of being red
overlaps the property of being scarlet. We may want to say more than this. For instance,
we might add that the property of being scarlet is a part of the property of being red.
We would then take on the obligation to spell out what, if anything, this additional claim
means.
7 Try it out on dispositions
In the rest of this paper I aim to try out the “overlap” idea on dispositions, specifically on
Heil’s “no-levels” account of dispositions. If the strategy works for dispositions, it can
probably be made to work for the rest.
7.1 What are they?
Heil (2005) offers a framework for a certain conception of dispositions. They are ac-
tual intrinsic features of things. Subjunctive conditionals may tell us something about
a disposition, but the disposition is something distinct from those sentences—its nature
is not exhausted by some set of subjunctive conditionals. A disposition fully fixes what
its manifestations can be like; in other words, the relation between a disposition and its
manifestations is not contingent. In particular, it is not contingent on what laws of nature
happen to hold.
According to Heil, dispositions are not grounded in something “lower level.” Indeed,
there are not levels of dispositions at all. If, by contrast, we thought that some disposi-
tions are realized by other dispositions, the consequence would be that the higher level
dispositions would not be causal powers. The argument is the mental causation argument
(347-350). Heil sees a trilemma: either the effect is overdetermined by both the more and
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the less fundamental property; or the lower level property is not by itself sufficient for the
effect; or else one of the purported causes really isn’t a cause. The first is implausible.
The second violates closure. On the third alternative, since the more fundamental dispo-
sition is the better candidate for making the effect happen, the higher level disposition
would be powerless. Since Heil assumes that dispositions are always “powerful”, it then
follows that there are no higher-level dispositions.
7.2 Using the overlap structure
The argument depends on the assumption that the more fundamental and the less funda-
mental properties are distinct (cf. the expression (349) “higher-level items”). Can we give
this up?
Heil comments at the start of his piece (343) that “‘Disposition’ is a term of art: you
can define dispositions as you please”. So perhaps we have some liberty in setting up an
account of dispositions that we can use in a “unified understanding of mind and world”
(351).
As I argued above, the “no-levels” account as Heil articulates it has the whiff of elim-
inativism, and I count that as a strike against the account as a unified understanding of
mind and world. What would happen if we say that dispositions can overlap?
The idea is to say that there are physical dispositions and also mental dispositions (and
others, of course). The mental ones overlap the physical ones. It’s so far left open what
exactly this means. We don’t have levels, since we don’t have any dispositions (fully)
distinct from the physical dispositions.
8 What “does causal work”?
So far, all we have is an answer to the exclusion argument: since the mental dispositions
and the physical dispositions aren’t distinct, they aren’t independent causes, and so the
exclusion argument doesn’t apply to them. But we haven’t begun to explain what it might
mean to say that a given event is caused by (is the manifestation of) both a physical dispo-
sition and a mental disposition.
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8.1 Overlap doesn’t do the work
The general point is that the overlap structure by itself doesn’t answer the question how
mental (etc.) generalities (etc.) “do their work” or make things happen.
The exclusion argument was supposed to show that the supervening candidate could
not cause the effect, since there can’t be more than one non-overdetermining independent
cause. Ok, so we have two candidates, which are not independent, and not overdetermin-
ing. It clearly doesn’t yet follow that they do both cause the effect. In fact, there appears
to be a perfectly good reason to say that they don’t: the physical cause is sufficient, if any-
thing is, to produce the effect. The mental candidate would be “‘pretend’ or ‘faux’” (Kim,
2005, 62), nothing new or different from the physical cause. This point doesn’t have any-
thing to do with the dispositional account; we could make the same argument in a view
that says that causation is driven by properties and laws.
Just to drive the point home, consider a particular account of the laws of nature, the
(Hume)/Mill/Ramsey/Lewis (MRL) view. According to Lewis’s formulation of the MRL
view, a law of nature is a sentence from a strongest simplest theory of everything (one of
the “best systems” of the world). We can define the notion of “causal work” or “making
something happen” in terms of the laws of nature. (This isn’t, of course, Lewis’s view.)
An event causes another event in virtue of its having property P just in case a description
of that effect follows logically from a best system together with a description of the event,
and the description of the cause refers to property P . Clearly the only properties that
contribute to “causal work” according to this definition are ones referred to by the laws of
nature, which will be the laws of fundamental physics.4
8.2 What does “doing the causal work” mean?
8.2.1 Humean answers
The textbook account of Hume’s answer to this question is, of course, “nothing at all.”
The only thing it could mean, according to Hume, is “necessary connexion”, but, it turns
4Thus a broadly Humean picture of what “making happen” means can be just as “fundamentalist” as any
other picture, and hence just as exposed to the mental causation problem.
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out, those words don’t actually correspond to any idea (or: they don’t mean anything).
Humeans other than Hume answer the question with fancy versions of “constant con-
junction”. They can, as we just saw, be fundamentalists. They don’t have to be. Consider
again the MRL view of laws, properties, and “doing the causal work”. There is no meta-
physical obstacle to broadening our conception of which sentences yield nomic properties.
Lewis (1983) demonstrated the need for “natural properties” by observing that there is no
obstacle to building up a theory of the world around any of the abundant properties, and
hence that the “best system” account radically underdetermines our concept of law. Once
we have “natural” properties, the number of best systems becomes manageable. But this
would seem to open the way to developing additional best systems around properties that
are nearly natural. Without trying to explain what that might mean, let’s suppose that psy-
chological predicates pick out nearly natural properties. So now we can say that an event
causes another because it has a physical property, and because it has a mental property,
since both properties are “nomic”, that is, related by “best systems” to properties of the
effect.
8.2.2 Non-Humean answers
Humean accounts of causation and law are not so popular these days. We want, it is felt,
something like that “necessary connexion”; we want to know how the cause makes the
effect happen.
One way to respond to this demand is to show that the relation between causes and
effects is necessary. There is a variety of proposals that make this demonstration: Sellars
(1948) argued that properties are individuated by what they do, and hence what they do is
essential to them; Shoemaker (1984) argues that causal powers necessitate their effects;
Armstrong (1983) argues that a law expresses a necessitation relation between universals
(although he also argues that whether this relation holds is itself contingent); Bird (2001)
offers the “down-and-up” argument to show that salt’s dissolving involves exactly the
same physical mechanism as water’s being able to dissolve, and hence it’s not possible for
salt not to dissolve in water. Ellis (2001) argues, as does Heil, that what dispositions do is
essential to them.
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8.2.3 Skepticism: necessity isn’t “connexion”
Suppose that these arguments do establish that the connection between an instance of
one of these generalities and an effect is a necessary one. Then Hume was wrong that
there is nothing necessary here. But do we now know what the connexion is? I don’t think
we do. Take Bird’s lovely demonstration. Salt is a crystalline molecule held together by
ionic bonding. The molecules in the lattice will experience electrostatic attraction and
repulsion. Hence Coulomb’s law is true of salt. Similarly, Coulomb’s law is true of water.
Hence the law that requires salt to dissolve in water follows from what salt and water are.
Hence dissolving is necessary. Now: why do atoms experience electrostatic attraction
and repulsion? The answer takes us down a level, to electrons and their charge, and the
geometry of the molecules. How does charge work, i.e., how does electrostatic attraction
bring together a negative and a positive ion? Well, there’s more to say about the structure
of what charge does. But, I think, in the end, there is an end to what we can say. At that
end, the answer to, “how does that work?” is, “it does”.5
Notice also that a purely Humean account of causation and laws has the resources
to hold that the connection between cause and effect is necessary. If properties are in-
dividuated with respect to the laws that govern their instances, then there is room for a
position on which property instances necessitate their effects. Take Lewis’s conception
of properties as sets of actual and possible individuals, and take some law of nature, for
instance Coulomb’s law. If the properties referred to by Coulomb’s Law are sets the mem-
bers of which are exactly the actual and possible individuals that satisfy the law, then the
law turns out to be necessary and the properties necessitate their effects. This explanation
of why the connection is necessary leaves what I take to be the disturbing conclusion of
Hume’s critique of causation untouched: there is no connexion between the cause and
effect, even though the effect necessarily happens, given the cause.
5Unless all of physics is grounded in some deeper necessity (as Einstein hoped that it all reduces to geome-
try).
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8.2.4 Overlap, dispositions, and process accounts of causation
Put skepticism aside. Suppose there is some account of “making happen” that holds of
generalities. I know of roughly three such accounts in the recent literature: (1) counterfac-
tual accounts, like Lewis’s, and more recently Woodward’s; (2) mechanism accounts, like
Glennan’s; and (3) process accounts, like Dowe’s. I myself find counterfactual accounts
unpromising, since it seems as though the truth of the relevant counterfactuals has to de-
pend on something else, like laws, or dispositions. Similarly mechanisms seem to me to
be explained on the basis of laws or dispositions, and not the other way around. So for the
remainder of this paper let me consider what it would be like to put a process account of
causation together with a view that holds that dispositions may overlap.
The process account of causation hold that when one event causes another, there is
a causal process that connects them; a causal process transmits a conserved quantity be-
tween the cause and the effect. Conserved quantities are defined in terms of physical
properties, like mass-energy, momentum and charge (Dowe, 2008, Section 5).
Putting this together with the basic dispositional account, we get, one event causes
another when the first has a disposition, and the manifestation of that disposition involves
the transmission of a conserved quantity. So take a case of mental causation: the desire
for the cheesecake causes Suzy to reach for the cheesecake. There’s some collection of
physical dispositions at work here; let’s call the collection P . P ’s causation of the arm to
move involves conserved physical quantities.
Now suppose thatM supervenes on P , and overlaps it. IfM can make E happen,
then there is some quantity conserved when E’s followM ’s. Two constraints seem neces-
sary:
• Non-additivity: the quantity conserved in theM /E transaction and the quantity
conserved in the P /E transaction are not independent. In particular, they must not
be “additive”. If, say, the total energy of the physical basis for the desire is con-
served as it moves the hand toward the cheesecake, and some quantity is conserved
in the desire/action causal transaction, the quantities don’t add up; the effect doesn’t
end up with more of anything than either quantity bestows;
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• Non-triviality: the existence of this conserved quantity should be non-trivial. The
conservation laws in mechanics are non-trivial in the sense that they are a structural
element in the theory of mechanics (cf. John Norton’s complaint, (Dowe, 2008,
Section 6.2)).
About Non-additivity, sinceM and P overlap, they aren’t distinct; so we could think
of the two conserved quantities as stemming from something like two alternative book-
keeping schemes for the same transaction. I don’t think Non-additivity is automatically
satisfied given overlap. There are two sciences here; we would have to explain on their
basis why the two quantities are not independent. (By contrast, without overlap, such an
explanation would be a great deal harder, since if the two properties are independent, they
would appear to make independent contributions to causation.)
If the Non-triviality constraint is satisfied, then there will have to be a science of the
domain in whichM falls—in this case, psychology must be a science. And this science
must describe psychology as involving causation and conserved quantities.6
Is there any chance whatsoever of psychology being like this? (Dowe, 2008, section
6.6) writes, “in any case, to suppose that the conserved quantity theory will deal with
causation in other branches of science also requires commitment to a fairly thorough
going reductionism, since clearly there is nothing in economics or psychology that could
pass for a conservation law”. Maybe Dowe is right about this. But what if he’s wrong?
Here are two thoughts.
(1) The norm for dispositions is that they exercise their powers only together with
other dispositions. This is all the more true for non-fundamental dispositions. Suppose
fragility is a disposition, and suppose a particular glass is fragile. There are lots of ways
to get it to shatter, and lots of ways for it to shatter. And there are all kinds of ways to
prevent it from shattering even if struck. A disposition like this thus exercises its powers
in a complex web-like way. If there were a quantity conserved in mental causation, per-
haps we should expect it to be distributed over such webs, and perhaps very difficult to
discover.
6I suppose it could be a matter of fact that there is a conserved quantity in mental/physical transactions, but
that we are epistemically closed off from it (as McGinn suggests about consciousness), but I don’t see any reason
to believe this.
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(2) A lot of psychological causation is causation involving propositional attitudes,
states of mind that are intentional, that is, about other things. It may be that some concept
of information is key to understanding intentionality; and it may be that that concept of
information is connected to conservation concepts. It may even be that some concept of
information is key to understanding consciousness, as Dretske thinks, and so something
similar might work for mental causation involving consciousness.
9 Conclusions
If mental properties are distinct from physical properties, the mental causation problem
looks hopeless; if they are identical with them, the cost of mental causation is elimina-
tivism. So, I’ve suggested, it’s time to try out saying that mental properties are neither
identical with nor distinct from physical properties: they overlap.
Overlap by itself does not yield causation or “making happen”. More is needed. Our
ordinary epistemic access to this extra bit is through science: where we find what Fodor
calls “special sciences,” sometimes (but probably not always) we are inclined to think that
the special science properties are involved in making things happen.
A philosopher with Humean inclinations will not go a lot farther than that: “making
happen” is a matter of some science telling us what happens. An anti-Humean philoso-
pher can go farther. She might have a positive theory of what “making happen” amounts
to. The theory will add to what the Humean philosopher says: science shows us where
to look for these higher-level “making happen” relations, and then, when we have found
them, we will also find the extra metaphysical bits that make up “making happen.” Even
if the anti-Humean philosopher doesn’t have a positive theory of what “making happen”
is (she might think of it as a primitive), she has a choice as to whether all of it is located
at the fundamental level, or whether it can occur at more than one level. If a fundamental
disposition and a higher-level disposition overlap, the anti-Humean philosopher can say
that both the fundamental disposition and the non-fundamental disposition make effects
happen.
I myself, in Dardis (2008), propose a neoHumean solution to the mental causation
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problem: (1) properties are roughly Lewisian, and so overlap is clearly defined for them;
(2) the “gold standard” for causal relevance is to be linked by strict laws; (3) mental prop-
erties can be linked by strict laws if those laws are qualified to compensate for ways in
which instances of the same kind of mental event can be microphysically different; finally,
(4) “causal work” is tied to the existence of a science.
I hope to have shown in this paper that the structure underlying this proposal is an
interesting and useful one that may profitably be implemented in a wide variety of meta-
physical settings.
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